Creating Safer Communities in Europe: a crime prevention sourcebook

Since the beginning of the 1980s, France has had one of the Europe's most progressive crime prevention strategies, based on "inclusion" of those at risk, rather than "exclusion" of criminals. A particular focus in France has been on a whole range of creative interventions with young people. Apparently as a direct result of this, the crime rate in France fell during most of the 1980s. Since 1988 the crime rate has shown a small increase. France's overall victimisation rate is the same as the European average, although there is slightly higher risk of more serious crimes.

Traditionally France had taken a somewhat repressive approach to crime control, fronted by the police. However, in March 1976, the Peyrefitte report clearly indicated a social malaise labelled le mal Français which was in danger of escalating into a dangerous progression of violence which was only being exacerbated by repressive policing policy. As a result of the Peyrefitte Report, task groups were formed to investigate:

In May 1981 there was a change of government which brought the left into power. They had spent their years in opposition denouncing the approach to crime based only on repressive policies, and what they regarded as the political exploitation of fear of crime. All this came to a head during the summer of 1981 in some of the suburbs around Paris and Lyon which experienced riotous behaviour, indiscriminate drag racing ('rodeos') and the torching of cars. This created considerable concern among the public and within government.

Thus the incoming government was faced with the task of resolving multiple problems, it had to: be seen to be dealing with the problem of crime; to invent effective new ways of combating the problem in place of the repressive approach they had rejected in the past; and to respond in the best way possible without major new expenditure, given the economic situation which required the redeployment of resources rather than the funding of additional ones.

The events of the summer of 1981 had occurred in particular sectors of the cities, especially among young people who had nothing to do. Thus it seemed clear that central government was not the most appropriate to solve the problem, at least not on its own and from on high. To understand what was happening and to work out solutions, the administration needed to involve elected officials and others at the local level, such as local school principals, social service directors, youth and sport administrators, police chiefs and magistrates, as well as the local population.

In the spring of 1982, the Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy decided to establish a commission composed of mayors from the four main political parties, to formulate concrete proposals to prevent crime and the fear of crime. This commission gave an opportunity to work together to tackle crime for the first time. Locally elected officials had much to gain from appearing to take seriously the question of crime, and rather than usurp the role of the administration they were prepared to work with it. A socialist mayor, M. Bonnemaison was elected chairman of the commission.

At the end of 1982, the commission submitted its report under the title 'Dealing with Delinquency: prevention, repression, solidarity' (Face à la Délinquance: prévention, représsion, solidarité). The main elements of the report were that to deal with crime, the traditional approach of police and criminal justice were insufficient. To be effective, a preventative policy should be flexible and adapted to local circumstances rather than monolithic for the country as a whole. It should bring together all the local partners, including several parts of the local administration such as the police, the judicial system, social services, public health, education, youth and sports, culture and housing. It should include elected officials such as the mayor and assistant mayor, as well as local representatives of the population including trade unions and non-profitmaking organisations. It should co-ordinate and integrate their activities and policies in order to achieve a more consistent and effective approach to crime at the least cost.

Fear of crime, the committee reported, should be treated simultaneously and in a co-ordinated manner at all levels. There should be revisions to policies on housing, education and employment to prevent the social isolation or exclusion of young people, but also adults, in difficulties. Consideration should given, in sentencing offenders, to the prevention of recidivism with the development of alternatives to imprisonment such as community service orders (travaux d'intérít général). There should be an emphasis on the rehabilitation of those imprisoned, with social and educational assistance during sentence and on release from prison. Finally, assistance should be given to the victims of crime.

On all of these points the elected officials on the commission concluded that the only way to achieve any measure of success was through joint effort by local communities and administrators. The report of the commission included 64 practical and precise recommendations covering five themes: the social environment and quality of life, youth protection, reform of administrative procedures, police activities and the organisation of permanent structures for crime prevention.

The committee's recommendations led to the setting up of the National Council for the Prevention of Crime (Conseil National de la Prévention de la Délinquance) under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister. At a regional level, Departmental Councils on the Prevention of crime were created for each "Department", chaired by the chief administrator for the region (Commissionaire de la République) with the chief judicial officer (Procurer de la République) as vice-chairman. Finally, the decree provided for a Communal Council on the Prevention of Crime for any city which wished to create one.

At each level the councils had three types of representation: the elected officials, representatives from the administration and citizen groups including trade unions and non-profitmaking organisations.

The approach recommended and adopted by each council was the same everywhere. No attempt was made to study, yet again, the causes of crime and delinquency, but rather to take action to deal with them. The essential point about the work of the councils is that it is carried out by the men and women who are on the ground and based on their own knowledge of the local problems. Any research or data collection if carried out is 'quick and dirty', supplementary to the action and not systematic.

The method recommended by the Prime Minister's circular of 14 October 1983 was as follows:

In 1983 Communal Councils were established in 18 pilot cities selected to represent those with different political parties in power, and by 1984 this number had increased to 42.

The procedure to ensure the collaboration between local administrators and their communities took on a new form in 1985, with the setting up of 'contracts for preventative action'. By 1986, more than 200 cities had proposed such contracts and the national Council had accepted and co-financed 115 of them. By mid 1986 there were more than 400 communal councils and covering half of the towns with more than 9,000 inhabitants.

Once a contract is accepted, the administration is generally responsible for 50 per cent of the operating costs, usually start-up grants which are not renewable in principle. The activities covered by the contracts are varied and may include the following:

The National Council made 48 million French francs available in 1985-6, of which about 28 million were used for crime prevention contracts. Decisions on the allocation of funds were taken by an executive committee within general guidelines established by the full assembly of the National Council.

Information campaigns and programmes to educate public opinion about crime set up by the National Councils were also associated with activities at the local level. This might involve short programmes on television or at the cinema which spotlight issues, the use of video tapes on particular themes, circulation of information newsletters, and in some instances the setting up of 'prevention weeks' in such cities as Strasbourg and Toulouse.

At the local level, the structure demonstrated clearly its benefits in terms of statistical changes in crime levels in certain areas. Thus in the Department of the Val-de-Marne south of Paris, prevention activities undertaken in the summer of 1985 were associated with a 65 per cent drop in the number of juveniles appearing before the court. Moreover, in the majority of communities where real progress was made, the local partners report that they were very satisfied with development.

In the 1990s, despite political changes France has continued to invest in a range of crime prevention measures. Fonds d'actions sociales des travailleurs migrants, has financed a plan of integration for immigrants focusing on activities and support for schoolchildren, teenagers, young adults (professional re-integration), sports and leisure, and family work.

Between 1991 and 1993 town strategies in respect of urban planning and housing with the objectives to offer suitable housing to every resident and to make the quality of life more pleasant through urban renewal.

Other plans like OPAH, Opération programmée de l'amélioration de l'habitat or MOUS, maitrise d'oeuvre urbaine et sociale, have been implemented in several problematic neighbourhood areas.

In 1992, an Interministerial committee of towns (CIV) to oversee urban social development through le contrat de villes, (action plan of towns). Such an action plan must find out the urban, social, economic weakness and strength of a town. Subsequent actions have usually concerned:

Droit de Cité - youth work by young people for young people. Droit de Cité was established in 1992 to offer meaningful activities to disadvantaged young people who were not being reached by the traditional youth services. The programme operates throughout France and has involved over 300,000 young people since its inception. Through cultural and sporting activities it aims to develop co-operation and leadership among young people so that they are "not a problem, but part of the solution". Through its "grass roots" origins and operation, Droit de Cité has had particular success with integrating young people from ethnic minorities who were becoming marginalised in many neighbourhoods.

In 1993, 5 priorities were laid out by the DIV (Delegation Interministerial de la Ville), more recently confirmed in le pacte de relance de la ville, the revived action plan for urban policy. These priorities require action to address the following:

These 5 priorities are a response to the synthesis of what is today the perception of delinquency in France - that it has become a behaviour of ever younger children, who are unresponsive to any kind of authority or sanction, which in turn has resulted from the parents' loss of authority, itself provoked by the lack of social support.

During 1997, in response to increasing numbers of violent incidents involving young people in schools, the government decided to recruit 30,000 'emplois-jeunes' (young assistants) to work in schools, alongside teachers. These young employees, deliberately chosen to be close to the age of the pupils, are expected to offer mediation, supervision, surveillance and pro-social encouragement at schools in Créteil, Lyon, Lille, Amiens, Versailles and Aix-Marseille.

The French police force has seen its role in the field of crime prevention diminished over the last twenty years. A large number of local authorities have developed local preventative policy without the police being involved. This is partly because the French police have, historically, had a militaristic approach which does not sit comfortably with integrative modes of prevention and partly because the French emphasis on social prevention implies a point of intervention before the police traditionally become involved in problems. However, there has recently been an interest in the community policing methods espoused in Britain and the USA, as a means of maintaining a sense of safety and security in neighbourhoods

The French "Model" has been able to establish that one-dimensional policies of 'total repression' or 'total prevention' are always insufficient, and that an effective policy of prevention and treatment of fear and crime must combine technical prevention (protection of property and goods) with a policy of partnership in social development in which the role of local communities and associations is recognised as essential.

Since its creation in 1983 the Communal Board for the Prevention of Crime and its partners have been engaged in numerous initiatives for the population of the districts of the town of Epinay-sur-Seine in the fields of education, culture, solidarity and economic development.

Institut des Hautes ˜tudes de la Sécurité Intérieure, 19, rue Peclet, 75015 Paris, France Tel: 331 53682083 Fax: 331 45305071. Email 6fm10@calvanet.ealvacom.fr

Conseil, Récherche, ˜tude pour la Planification, l'Amenagement et l'Habitat (CREPAH), 4 rue Lord Byron, Paris, Cedex 08 Tel (00331) 40757932 Fax (00331) 45629041.

Droit de Cite, 5 rue du Colonel Moll, 75017, Paris. Tel (00331) 45744004 Fax (0031) 45742501.

Page last updated: 17 June 2004

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